I’ve come to believe that the ongoing dispute between “scientific knowledge” and the humanities is due to the simple fact that what is currently defined as “science” lacks stable internal critical tools (cf. Kuhn, normal science), whereas philosophy contains both self-critical tools and instruments for critiquing scientific knowledge. In times when the “scientific” interpretation overlaps with political action, serving as its foundation (to varying degrees of truth), it’s quite clear that criticism of such action is met with hostility and opposition, often denounced as “anti-scientific” or “false,” since “truth” is now seen as the exclusive domain of “science.”
Browsing through Italian media and online spaces, the expression “pensiero unico” (single thought) is common—used both by those who denounce its existence and by those who mock the former, arguing that the presence of dissenting opinions in the media proves that no such single thought exists. This clearly shows how language can distort the foundations of dialectics. Probably, speaking of dominant discourses would be more appropriate. And speaking of one-dimensional thought would have been even more effective. The expression, of course, comes from Herbert Marcuse. And it is striking how his One-Dimensional Man still feels relevant today—even starting from the title of its introduction, The Paralysis of Criticism: Society Without Opposition:
“Under these circumstances, our mass media find little difficulty in selling particular interests as those of all rational men. The political needs of society become individual needs and aspirations; their satisfaction promotes business and the general welfare, and the whole appears to be the very embodiment of Reason.”
And this remains true today, even though material advantage has often disappeared. Our era is vastly different from the post–World War II years of development. Yet the “rational men” Marcuse refers to are still today’s vectors of one-dimensional thought, despite inflation, despite unemployment. In our times, where policies are deemed good a priori—regardless of their results—even “rational men” are rational a priori, because that is what is considered right.
Today, it’s quite clear that the monopoly on communication once held by traditional mainstream media has been broken by the rise of social media. However, the loss of monopoly hasn’t led to the marginalization of the “rational” message, which has largely found a home in the new media as well. So if “single thought” is a blunt weapon, the phenomenon it refers to is still real and present. One-dimensional thought defines who the “rational men” are, just as the “delirious front” is defined by its articles of faith. But the delirious front does not express a critique of one-dimensional society; it expresses only a legitimate rejection—but one based on more than irrational theses—delirious ones, indeed. To borrow from Prigogine (The End of Certainty), these are two alienated and alienating worldviews, symmetrical (in Prigogine’s case, “everything is predictable” / “nothing is predictable”).
The narrow space of criticism—equated by one-dimensional thought with the delirious front—struggles not to fall into one or the other pole of this conflict. At the risk of being repetitive, this stems from adopting the opponent’s method—one that bases its policies on “science.” We should internalize the fact that emergency policies are inherently distorting of the democratic process—whether or not their scientific basis is sound (cf. Carlo Galli, Democrazia ultimo atto?)—and focus our critique there. Too often, instead, political debate has sought to attack the adversary’s “science” with equally unfounded “science.” It is no coincidence that Massimo Cacciari’s Metafisica Concreta opens with a Gospel of John quote: “We worship what we know.” It is a programmatic beginning for a book worthy of attention, in which scientific practice is a recurring theme. But the cornerstone of that beginning may well be blown apart by triggering a Nietzschean aphorism:
“Knowledge for the sake of knowledge — this is the last snare laid by morality: we are once more completely caught in it.”
The battle for the “scientific truth” of political action’s postulates is futile because it is sterile—and its sterility has been widely demonstrated. At best, the (genuinely) scientific and divergent study upon which someone wishes to build political opposition will be labeled by the “rational” and by “rational” policies as unscientific and fraudulent. The case of Ioannidis, above all, should be remembered in this regard.
Thus, not falling into the trap is the only way to build a true political and social opposition.
